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ARTICLE REPRINT
On January 22, 2014, the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) dismissed a case 
brought by the United Kingdom (U.K.), in 
which the U.K. sought to annul Article 28 
of Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 
the European Union regarding short selling 
activities.1 The U.K. government had brought 
this case on May 31, 2012.
INTRODUCTION ON  
SHORT SELLING
Short selling, in general, consists of selling 
shares of common stock that are not owned 
by the Seller, who typically is betting that 
the price of that common stock will decline, 
and thus be cheaper to buy back, resulting 
in a profit. In a “naked” short sale, the 
Seller does not borrow or arrange to borrow 
the securities in time to make delivery of 
the underlying stock to the Buyer within 
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the standard three-day settlement period.2 Short 
selling can often result in sudden price volatility 
of a particular stock, especially if there is a large 
amount of short selling on a particular stock within 
a relatively short period of time. Many believe that 
short selling, in addition to reckless credit default 
swap (CDS) trading, created major price volatility 
in the months of September and October, 2008, that 
contributed, in part, to the 2008 financial crisis.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
has taken many different positions on short selling, 
ranging from permitting or prohibiting the activity 
either on a temporary or final basis, to restricting it 
with respect to certain types of stocks traded. In one 
press release, the SEC stated:
“Short selling often can play an important 
role in the market for a variety of reasons, 
including contributing to efficient price 
discovery, mitigating market bubbles, 
increasing market liquidity, promoting 
capital formation, facilitating hedging 
and other risk management activities, 
and, importantly, limiting upward market 
manipulations. There are, however, 
circumstances in which short selling can be 
used as a tool to manipulate the market.”3
As a result of “fails-to-deliver,” which is a 
common occurrence in connection with short selling 
and the potential of abuse that may result from short 
selling, the SEC adopted Regulation SHO in 2004, 
which requires, among other things, firms that clear 
and settle trades, to purchase the shares to close out 
these fails-to-deliver within 13 days.4
The SEC imposed a ban on short selling on 
financial stocks on September 19, 2008.5 Shortly 
thereafter, the SEC adopted SEC Rule 10b-21, the 
“Naked Short Selling Antifraud Rule,” to make it 
unlawful for any person:
“to submit an order to sell a security if 
that person deceives a broker-dealer, 
participant of a registered clearing agency, 
or purchaser regarding his/her intention, 
or ability, to deliver the security by 
settlement date and that person fails to 
deliver the security by settlement date.”6
The SEC later established an interim temporary 
rule, which it made final on July 29, 2009, that 
resulted in the adoption of SEC Rule 204.7 Rule 204 
was designed to make it a violation of Regulation 
SHO if a clearing firm does not purchase or borrow 
shares to close-out a fail-to-deliver that may result 
from a short sale within one day after the required 
settlement date, or T+4.8
Many other countries also established bans on 
short selling in September 2008, some of which 
continue to the present date. Given the importance 
of the financial services industry in London, 
the U.K. government has always taken a more 
aggressive view relating to restrictions placed on its 
financial services industry. This case is an example 
of other actions that have been taken by the U.K. 
government to challenge other ESMA Regulations 
involving, among other things, restrictions on 
executive compensation.
SETTING OF THE CASE
This action was brought by the U.K. against 
the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union. The principal argument raised by 
the U.K. was simply that the European Securities 
and Market Authority (“ESMA”) did not properly 
apply Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Regulation (EU) No 236”).
ESMA was initially established by Regulation (EU) 
No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament (“EP”) 
and of the Council of the European Union (“Council”) 
on November 24, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the 
“ESMA Regulation”). ESMA is part of the European 
System of Financial Supervision (“ESFS”), whose 
purpose is to supervise the EU’s financial system. 
ESFS also comprises a Joint Committee of the various 
European Supervisory Authorities and those of the 
respective Member States.
Article 1(2) of the ESMA Regulation gives ESMA 
certain powers to legally bind the EU, and Articles 
8 and 9 of the ESMA Regulation sets out its tasks 
regarding financial market participants. Specifically, 
ESMA Regulation 9(5) provides that ESMA may 
prohibit or restrict certain financial activities that 
may threaten the integrity or stability, in whole or 
in part, of the EU’s financial system. Pursuant to 
Article 44(1), a Member State, such as the U.K., 
may request ESMA to reconsider any decisions that 
it may make. The U.K. government brought this 
case based on this Article.
Regulation (EU) No 236, which was adopted in 
March 2012, lays the foundation for regulations 
established by ESMA. In particular, ESMA 
may establish regulations relating to financial 
instruments,9 certain derivatives and certain debt 
instruments. Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 236 
defines a “short sale” to mean:
CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1
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“any sale of the share or debt instrument 
which the seller does not own at the time 
of entering into the agreement to sell, 
including such a sale where at the time 
of entering into the agreement to sell the 
seller has borrowed or agreed to borrow 
the share or debt instrument for delivery 
. . .”
Pursuant to Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 
236, ESMA may prohibit or impose conditions by 
natural or legal persons with respect to such short 
sales provided that such actions taken by ESMA 
(i) address a threat to the orderly functioning 
and integrity of the EU’s financial markets or to 
its financial system, in whole or in part, and (ii) 
no other competent authority (e.g., another EU 
country) has taken the necessary actions to address 
this threat. This is a conjunctive test. In making 
these determinations, ESMA must determine that 
its actions do not, among other things, create a risk 
of regulatory arbitrage or result in a detrimental 
effect on the efficiency of financial markets by, for 
example, reducing the liquidity in the market. If 
another EU country adopts, for example, a specific 
regulation that may differ from or conflict with 
ESMA’s fundamental regulatory policies, then 
ESMA may notify that other EU country, after 
consulting with the European Systemic Risk Board 
(“ESRB”) or with other authorities, that ESMA 
intends to take measures against the regulation 
adopted by that other EU country. The measure 
takes effect immediately after ESMA posts the 
notice on its website.10
This threat to the orderly functioning and integrity 
of the EU financial system implies a very high 
standard before ESMA may act, that is: (i) any threat 
of serious financial, monetary or budgetary instability 
concerning a Member State, (ii) the possibility of a 
default by a Member State; (iii) any serious damage to 
the physical structures of important financial issuers, 
clearing and settlement systems and supervisors; or 
(iv) any serious disruption in any payment system or 
settlement process.11
The U.K. government thus challenged the right of 
ESMA, pursuant to Article 28, to ban short selling, 
even if just for a temporary period.
EUROPEAN COURT OF  
JUSTICE PROCEEDING
The action, as noted above, was brought by the 
U.K. to annul Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 
236, which gave ESMA the powers noted above to 
ban short selling within the EU. Interestingly, Spain, 
France, Italy and the European Commission joined 
the action in support of the EP, thus opposing the 
U.K. action.
ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE  
U.K. GOVERNMENT
The U.K. government basically made five 
arguments, namely:
1. The authority granted to ESMA, pursuant to 
Article 28(2), gives ESMA a very large measure 
of discretion, which is too subjective in nature 
in determining whether a threat to the EU 
financial system may occur. In addition, the 
U.K. argued that when ESMA must determine 
whether a competent authority (e.g., the U.K. in 
this case) has taken measures or not that address 
the threat, ESMA will actually be making actual 
economic policies, a power that ESMA does not 
have, and will thus require ESMA to arbitrate 
conflicting public interests of the country that 
adopted the conflicting regulation versus the 
entire EU.12
2. Article 28(2) gives ESMA too many choices 
to apply, each of which have very significant 
economic and financial policy decisions, 
including requiring a decision which determines 
the measure’s impact on liquidity and the level of 
uncertainty that will be created in the financial 
markets. The U.K. government argued that any 
such decision could result in unquantifiable 
judgments without any objective review.13
3. The tests to be applied by ESMA, pursuant to 
Article 28(3), are too subjective in nature, thus 
giving ESMA too much discretion in determining 
which measures to apply. This provision does 
not require ESMA to compare the detriments 
versus the benefits that the measure may bring 
to the markets.14
4. Even though any measures taken by ESMA may 
be temporary, such measures could still have 
long-term consequences on the markets and 
could adversely impact the overall confidence in 
the markets.15
5. ESMA is given too much discretion, which 
could affect macroeconomic policies.16
This article will summarize the ECJ’s decision on 
each of these arguments.
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THE FIRST U.K. PLEA
From a legislative comparison perspective, the 
U.S. Congress enacts all laws that come into force 
after the U.S. President signs the respective law. In 
Europe, there is a Trilogue that comprise its legislative 
process. The three main European legislative bodies 
are the European Parliament (“EP), the Council of 
the European Union (“Council”) and the European 
Commission (“EC”). Each of these three legislative 
bodies argued against the U.K. government’s 
positions in this case.
Arguments made by the European Par-
liament on the First Plea
The EP made the following arguments:
1. The EP contends that ESMA’s actions are not 
policy considerations but complex professional 
considerations. Article 28(2) permits actions 
needed to address certain well-defined threats, 
which require a high degree of technical and 
economic expertise and information.17
2. The powers bestowed on ESMA under Article 
28 are subject to very specific criteria and 
information.18
Arguments made by the Council of the 
European Union on the First Plea
The Council made two arguments, namely:
1. ESMA does not have any discretion and is 
obligated to adopt such measures only if certain 
conditions apply (e.g., where there is a threat to 
the orderly functioning and integrity of the EU 
financial system).19
2. ESMA must exercise a certain power of 
assessment, and thus needs the ability to adopt 
executive decisions in a specific factual context.20
Arguments made by the European 
Commission on the First Plea
The EC argued as follows:
1. An institution, such as ESMA, can be delegated 
clearly defined executive decision-making 
powers, especially, as here, there is no actual 
transfer of responsibilities.21
2. ESMA has the requisite authority, just as other 
EU bodies do, to apply its field of expertise to 
ensure the orderly functioning and integrity of 
the EU financial system.22
The ECJ’s Decision on the First Plea
The ECJ opinion noted that all of the parties in this 
case had cited the importance of the case of Meroni & 
Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, S.A.S. v High Authority 
of the European Coal and Steel Community, a case 
decided by this same court back on June 13, 1958.23 
However, each party interpreted Meroni differently. 
The ECJ cited Meroni as holding that:
“ . . . the consequences resulting from a 
delegation of authority are very different 
depending on whether it involves clearly 
defined executive powers the exercise of 
which can, therefore be subject to strict 
review in the light of objective criteria 
determined by the delegating authority, or 
whether it involves a discretionary power 
implying a wide margin of discretion which 
may, according to the use which is made 
of it, make possible the execution of the 
actual economic policy.”24
The Meroni court ruled against the decision made 
by the regulatory bodies in that case. The ECJ, 
however, distinguished Meroni as that case involved 
entities governed by private law whereas ESMA is 
a EU entity, created by the EP. It then stated that, 
unlike the powers delegated to the bodies at issue in 
Meroni, in this case, Article 28 of Regulation (EU) 
No 236 is “circumscribed by various conditions and 
criteria which limit ESMA’s discretion.”25 The ECJ 
then stated:
1. ESMA clearly has the authority to adopt 
measures under Article 28(1) provided, 
however, that such measures address a threat to 
the orderly functioning and integrity of the EU 
financial system.26
2. ESMA must take into account the extent to 
which the measure (e.g., the ban on short selling 
in this case) significantly addresses the so-called 
threat noted above. ESMA must therefore 
examine a significant number of the factors set 
forth in Articles 28(2) and (3) of Regulation 
(EU) No 236 before taking any such measure.27
3. Pursuant to Articles 28(4) and (5), before 
adopting any such measure, ESMA must also 
consult with the ESRB and, if necessary, other 
relevant European bodies. Therefore, ESMA’s 
margin of discretion in adopting any such 
measure (e.g., the ban on short selling in this 
case) is circumscribed by both this consultation 
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requirement and the temporary nature of the 
measure being taken.28
4. The ECJ then stated that ESMA’s powers to 
temporarily ban short selling clearly complied 
with the requirements laid down in Meroni.29
Accordingly, the ECJ held that the U.K.’s first plea 
shall not succeed.
THE SECOND U.K. PLEA
Arguments by the Parties
The parties addressed the principle set forth in the 
Romano case, another case regarding the powers 
of another European administrative body.30 The 
U.K. argued that Article 28 exceeded its powers 
as it authorizes ESMA to adopt “quasi-legislative” 
measures, and that this power granted to ESMA is 
contrary to the principle established in Romano, 
which held, in essence, that an administrative 
body cannot adopt acts having the force of law.31 
The U.K. then argued that a prohibition on short 
sales affects the entire class of persons engaging in 
transactions in that instrument.32 The EP argued 
that the measures taken by ESMA to prohibit short 
sales were related to specific financial instruments 
and that any such measures (e.g., the ban on short 
selling) constitute an executive decision and are 
not “quasi-legislative” provisions that constitute 
law under Romano.33 The Council took a similar 
position and argued that “ESMA confines itself to 
pitting into practice EU legislation, so that decisions 
adopted under that provision (Article 28) are 
executive and not legislative in nature.”34
The ECJ’s Decision on the Second Plea
The ECJ held that, under Article 28, ESMA may 
adopt rules affecting natural persons who enter into 
specific financial instruments and that Article 28 is 
not at odds with Romano.35 Therefore, the U.K. 
failed to establish that the delegation of powers 
granted to ESMA under Article 28 is at odds with 
the condition that “only clearly defined executive 
powers may be delegated.”36 The ECJ thus rejected 
this second plea brought by the U.K.
THE THIRD U.K. PLEA
Arguments made by the Parties on the 
Third Plea
In this plea, the U.K. basically argued that the 
Council has no authority under the treaties to 
delegate powers, such as those embodied in Article 
28, to a EU agency (e.g., ESMA). Therefore, the 
measure prohibiting an entire class of investors 
from engaging in short sales is “a measure of general 
application which cannot be entrusted to such an 
agency.”37 The EP contended, on the other hand, 
that the EP may confer powers on EU agencies, such 
as ESMA, to adopt measures of an executive nature, 
especially in areas which require specific technical 
expertise.38 The EC argued that the treaties “do not 
rule out the possibility that the EU legislature or the 
Commission may, in principle, delegate such powers 
to a non-institutional body.”39
The ECJ’s decision on the Third Plea
Article 28 delegates powers to a EU body or 
agency. The issue, therefore, in this Third Plea, is 
whether the treaties40 were designed to create a 
single legal framework under which only the EC 
may act or whether certain powers can be delegated 
to EU bodies or agencies, such as ESMA.41 The ECJ 
then held that, while the treaties did not contain 
any specific provision delegating powers to a EU 
body or agency, there is a presumption that such 
a possibility exists.42 The ECJ then inferred that 
the judicial review mechanisms that apply to EU 
bodies and agencies, as included in the treaties, are 
comparable to the decision-making powers granted 
to ESMA under Article 28.43 Therefore, Article 28 
cannot be considered in isolation, and that ESMA 
was granted the necessary powers to intervene 
to deal with adverse developments that threaten 
the financial stability within the EU, including the 
power to impose temporary restrictions on short 
selling.44 The ECJ rejected this third plea.45
THE FOURTH U.K. PLEA
Arguments made by the Parties  
on the Fourth Plea
The U.K. then argued that Article 28 did not 
authorize ESMA to take measures against natural 
persons or companies, and that those measures 
adopted by ESMA to ban short selling are of a 
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general application.46 The U.K. thus argued that 
the treaties did not empower the EP to delegate this 
power to adopt decisions that constitute a general 
application to a EU body or agency, such as ESMA.47
The EP argued that there is a need for 
harmonization among the Member States, and that 
ESMA may intervene in situations where actions at 
a national level have not been sufficient or adequate, 
including taking actions, such as banning short-
selling, to ensure this need for harmonization.48 The 
EC claimed that ESMA’s actions to regulate short 
selling activities also harmonized the divergent 
national provisions in this field.49
The ECJ’s decision on the Fourth Plea
The ECJ held, with respect to this fourth 
argument, that the EP may clearly delegate powers to 
an EU body or agency to implement harmonization 
among the Member States (e.g., EU countries) and 
those measures may be directed at certain persons, 
including natural persons or companies.50 The 
ECJ also held that the EP permitted rules to take 
a legislative form to ensure that regulations, such 
as a ban on short selling, are applied in a uniform 
manner.51 The ECJ then held that Article 28, which 
was the basis behind ESMA’s regulation to ban short 
selling, was clearly intended to harmonize the laws 
and regulations in the Member States relating to 
stock transactions and to improve the conditions for 
the establishment and functioning of the financial 
markets.52 The ECJ rejected this fourth plea.
CONCLUSION
What does this decision mean? While the heart of 
the decision deals with the validity of the delegation 
of authority by the Trilogue to European agencies, 
such as ESMA, the real test lies with the growth 
and powers granted to these agencies and whether 
these agencies actually improve the effectiveness 
and credibility of the European regulatory policies 
versus retaining that authority and power within 
the European Commission itself or by a Member 
State. The U.K. government clearly believed that 
it can and should be allowed to regulate financial 
firms located, and products sold, within the U.K. 
and should not be subject to the more harmonized 
EU rules established by ESMA. Some claimed that 
this case dealt a serious blow to the U.K.’s attempt 
to limit the power of the EU regulatory bodies.53 
It will be interesting to see whether these agencies, 
such as ESMA, will work closely with regulatory 
agencies located within a EU country, such as the 
U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, or take on a 
more autonomous role.
On the specific issue of short selling, things have 
changed dramatically since the 2008 financial crisis. 
For many years, it has been a roller-coaster ride on 
this issue with prohibitions, followed by temporary 
permissibility, followed by additional regulatory 
approaches around the globe. In this case, the 
interest of a major financial center, London, lost 
its battle to regulate itself to the need for a more 
harmonized financial regulatory world within the 
entire EU. It will also be interesting to see whether 
this movement toward greater harmonization 
within the EU has an effect on U.S. regulations. 
Just witness the recent Joint Statement made by 
Acting CFTC Chair Mark Wetjen and European 
Commissioner Michel Barnier, in which they 
announced that the staffs at the CFTC and the EC 
have made significant progress toward harmonizing 
a regulatory framework for CFTC- regulated swap 
execution facilities (“SEFs”) and EU-regulated 
multilateral trading facilities (“MTFs”).54
Another important policy issue is whether the 
increased amount of financial regulations within 
Europe produces the necessary results. This same 
debate is taking place here in the U.S. Moreover, in 
the U.S., we have a very large number of regulatory 
agencies, especially when you consider the roles 
played by the States in regulating banks, insurance 
companies and even securities firms. An interesting 
regulatory policy argument lies with whether more or 
less regulatory agencies prove to be beneficial or not.
One final point is the response by the U.K. 
government to the ECJ decision. On February 
3, 2014, in a Written Answer issued by the U.K. 
government to a question raised by Lord Myners, 
in which the Commercial Secretary to the Treasury, 
Lord Deighton, stated:
“The Government is disappointed that the 
Court of Justice of the European Justice 
has not upheld the UK’s challenge to annul 
Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation. 
We have consistently said we want tough 
financial regulation that works, but any 
powers conferred on EU agencies must be 
consistent with the EU treaties and ensure 
legal certainty. However, this ruling bears 
no impact on the day-to-day application of 
the Regulation.”55
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